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Achieving net-zero CO2 emissions has become the explicitgoal of many climate-energy
policies around the world. Although many studies have assessed net-zero emissions path-
ways, the common features and tradeoffs of energy systems across global scenarios at the
point of net-zero CO2 emissions have not yet been evaluated. Here, we examine the energy
systems of 177 net-zero scenarios and discuss their long-term technological and regional
characteristics in the context of current energy policies. We find that, on average, renewable
energy sources account for 60% of primary energy at net-zero (compared to ∼14% today),
with slightly less than half of that renewable energy derived from biomass. Meanwhile,
electricity makes up approximately half of final energy consumed (compared to ∼20%
today), highlighting the extent to which solid, liquid, and gaseous fuels remain prevalent in
the scenarios even when emissions reach net-zero. Finally, residual emissions and offsetting
negative emissions are not evenly distributed across world regions, which may have
important implications for negotiations on burden-sharing, human development, and equity.
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Limiting global mean temperature increase to 2 °C or even1.5 °C relative to the preindustrial era1 requires that globalannual CO2 emissions are net-zero or net-negative by the
end of this century, and perhaps as soon as 20502–5. In the
broader context of climate stabilization, the magnitude of global
temperature increase is directly proportional to cumulative CO2
emissions, such that adding any amount of CO2 to the atmo-
sphere will increase future amounts of warming2,6. For these
reasons, and because it is a clear and absolute target, achieving
net-zero emissions is increasingly a goal of energy and emissions
policies around the world3,7–10. Central to meeting this goal is a
rapid and sweeping transformation of energy systems, including
drastic reductions in the use of fossil fuels, substantial improve-
ments in energy and materials efficiency, extensive electrification
of energy end uses, and management of carbon11–16. Moreover,
this transformation of energy systems must be reconciled with
both sustainable development goals17,18 and the considerable
inertia of existing fossil energy infrastructure19.
Given this context, energy analysts are increasingly exploring
the challenges and opportunities for net-zero emissions energy
systems20, including detailed analyses of specific energy services
and/or technologies21–25. A number of recent studies have
examined the mitigation pathways of energy systems in integrated
assessment model (IAM) scenarios that limit warming to below
1.5 °C26–30, providing insight about possible transformations of
the energy-economy-land system. However, the common features
and tradeoffs of such scenarios at the point when global CO2
emissions reach net-zero have yet to be systematically assessed.
These characteristics at the point of net-zero CO2 can inform
policies that might take varying approaches – including potential
approaches that are not represented by current scenario pathways
– to reach the same goal of net-zero emissions.
Here, we analyze 177 IAM scenarios from the public 1.5 °C
Scenario Database (the SR1.5 database)31,32 in which global
sources and sinks (including land use and agriculture) reach net-
zero CO2 emissions by 2100 (see Supplementary Table 1). Details
of our processing and analytic approach are described in the
Methods section. In summary, we assess global and regional
energy use, energy sources, residual emissions, electrification, and
climate policy among the scenarios, finding robust features that
span multiple IAMs 33. For example, renewable sources represent
roughly 60% of primary energy at the point when they reach net-
zero CO2 emissions—and often more than half of such renewable
energy is provided by biomass. However, it is important to note
that the scenario ensemble is not a representative sample that can
be used to infer likelihood; individual scenarios are equally
plausible given model constraints.
Results
Energy use and timing of net-zero. Figure 1 shows the rela-
tionships among global energy and socioeconomic variables in
the year of global net-zero emissions, broken out by the level of
projected global warming. These categories include overshoot
scenarios that return to the specified amount of warming by the
end-of-century (see Methods). Among the 177 net-zero scenarios,
those that avoid mean end-of-century warming of 1.5 °C (blue
points) tend to have lower levels of global energy use (t-statis-
tic= 9.2, p < 0.001) and less GDP per capita (t-statistic= 8.6,
p < 0.001): of the 77 1.5 °C scenarios, GDP per capita is < $40,000
per person per year in 91% (median $27,914, range
$20,103–$58,506) and total final energy use is <500 EJ in 69%
(median 439 EJ, range 227–646; Fig. 1a). In contrast, energy use
and GDP per capita are substantially higher in scenarios that
achieve net-zero emissions but exceed 1.5 °C (green and orange
points): of the 100 2 °C and >2 °C scenarios, GDP per capita
is < $40,000 per person per year in only 43% (median $43,642,
range $20,299–$116,666) and total final energy use is <500 EJ in
24% (median 580 EJ, range 345–857; Fig. 1a). Although this may
reflect reduced energy use and economic activity in scenarios with
the most ambitious mitigation, it is also related to when net-zero
emissions occur in these scenarios. Supplementary Fig. 1 supports
this idea by showing that warming level is not strongly related to
the levels of energy use and GDP ultimately reached in net-zero
scenarios. Figure 1b shows that the warmer scenarios achieve net-
zero emissions in progressively later years (median for all sce-
narios= 2064, range 2037–2100), because the additional time for
the economy and energy system to grow in these scenarios leads
to higher cumulative CO2 emissions (and therefore higher levels
of subsequent warming). Supplementary Figs. 2 and 3 support
this idea that more ambitious scenarios achieve lower levels of
warming via faster energy system transformations. However, in
contrast to the timing of net-zero, the timing of peak emissions is
consistent across the scenarios (and essentially immediate):
emissions peak in 2017 (range 2014–2027) for 1.5 °C scenarios, in
2019 (range 2011–2029) for 2 °C scenarios, and in 2022 (range
2010–2036) for >2 °C scenarios (Fig. 1b). Although many sce-
narios show emissions peaking prior to 2019 (which did not
occur), the regional, socio-economic, and technological repre-
sentations that prevail when these scenarios achieve net-zero
emissions may nonetheless provide valuable insights for net-zero
emissions policies.
Energy sources. The use and sources of renewable energy in net-
zero scenarios vary considerably, with no obvious relationship to
the level of warming (Fig. 1c). Although the median share of
primary energy derived from renewable sources (including bio-
mass, solar, wind, hydroelectricity, and geothermal, using the
direct equivalent method34) is ∼60% regardless of warming level,
in some cases it is as little as 25% and reaches 80% in a few others
(Fig. 1c). Similarly, the median share of these renewables that are
not biomass is ∼55% regardless of warming level, but ranges from
20–89% (Fig. 1c). Supplementary Fig. 4 further decomposes the
sources of primary energy in net-zero scenarios, showing, for
example, that the largest share of primary energy from nuclear is
23%, with nuclear more often contributing a small share of energy
(median share across all scenarios is 4.8%, range 0–23.4%).
Moreover, the share of primary energy from fossil fuels (coal, oil,
and natural gas) in net-zero scenarios with and without carbon
capture ranges from 3–64%, with a median share across all sce-
narios of 33% (Supplementary Fig. 4). By definition, in net-zero
scenarios, any residual emissions to the atmosphere from the use
of fossil fuels are offset by negative emissions strategies.
Residual emissions and electrification. The scale of residual
emissions, i.e. emissions that are counter-balanced by equivalent
carbon sequestration, is important to consider given many fea-
sibility concerns about negative emissions technologies33,35.
Figure 1d shows that the emissions intensity of final energy may
remain quite high in net-zero scenarios (e.g., >30 Mt CO2/EJ
compared to the current level of ∼80 Mt CO2/EJ). This residual
emissions intensity is insensitive to the warming level or the
energy intensity of the global economy (although lower warming
scenarios do tend to have lower energy intensities based on
median values by warming group; Fig. 1d). Given that the points
depicted in Fig. 1d are globally net-zero, the residual emissions
are entirely offset by negative emissions.
Complementing the common assertion that everything must be
electrified36,37, the scenario set indicates that reducing final
energy use is also an important determinant for achieving 1.5 or
2 °C. Electricity accounts for 35–80% of final energy across the
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Fig. 1 Energy system parameters in global net-zero CO2 emissions scenarios. Scenarios that reach net-zero emissions show differences in energy use
(a), emissions trajectory (b), energy sources (c), residual emissions (d), electrification (e), and policy (f), particularly with respect to warming levels
(blue= <1.5 °C, green= <2.0 °C, orange= >2.0 °C). Points represent individual scenarios, with a frequency of scenarios shown along each axis for each
warming level (colors corresponding to warming levels) and for all scenarios (black). Colored dashed lines and values indicate medians for warming
groups, with colors corresponding to warming groups. Gray dashed lines indicate reference values for the year shown in gray.
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range of net-zero scenarios, but is <70% in most >2 °C scenarios
(Fig. 1e). Even though electrification is a useful mechanism for
decarbonization, warmer scenarios tend to exhibit slightly higher
levels of electrification at the timing of net-zero: median shares of
1.5 °C, 2 °C and >2 °C scenarios are 46% (range 35–80%), 51%
(range 38–77%), and 53% (range 42–67%), respectively, perhaps
because they afford greater time for end-uses to transition
(Fig. 1e). This transition-time effect on the amount of electrifica-
tion is supported by Supplementary Fig. 3, which shows that
scenarios that are later in reaching net-zero tend to compensate
with higher amounts of electrification (Supplementary Fig. 3e).
Warming amount is also correlated to both net-zero year
(r= 0.73, p < 0.001; Fig. 1b) and electrification (r= 0.27,
p < 0.001) in the Fig. 1 global scenarios, which further supports
the idea that warmer scenarios have slightly higher amounts of
electrification because they reach net-zero emissions later, thus
allowing more time for end-uses to transition and for costs to
decline. However, these are subtle distinctions in comparison to
the differences in per capita final energy use, where median shares
in 1.5 °C, 2 °C and >2 °C scenarios increase from 47 to 63 to 75 GJ
per person, respectively. For comparison, in 2019 the average
American, EU, and Chinese citizen used approximately 202, 93,
and 63 GJ, respectively. Thus, keeping final energy low is clearly
important to meet 1.5 °C, while there is more flexibility in the
level of electrification that is required.
Negative emissions and policy. The prevailing carbon prices in
net-zero scenarios—a proxy for global climate policies—range
from zero to > $1000/t CO2, yet with no clear relationship to
either warming level or the amount of carbon sequestration
through bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)
(Fig. 1f; note that 16 scenarios with prices > $2000/t CO2 are not
shown). It is important to note that carbon prices in the majority
of SR1.5 scenarios are endogenous “shadow” carbon prices that
reflect the marginal cost of abatement, and thus do not directly
reflect the impact of explicit (exogenous) carbon pricing such as a
carbon tax or cap-and-trade system33,38,39. Only 23 of the
177 scenarios we analyze here include exogenous carbon pricing.
The relationship between BECCS and carbon price should
therefore be interpreted as the impact of marginal abatement cost
on BECCS deployment. The lack of a clear relationship between
the two does not necessarily mean that marginal abatement cost is
inconsequential for the magnitude of negative emissions, but
rather indicates that other dynamics relating to technology
availability and costs may be the main drivers of BECCS
deployment. Additionally, the median amount of carbon
sequestration from BECCS increases in 1.5 °C, 2 °C and >2 °C
scenarios, from 6.4 (range 0–16.7) to 8.0 (range 0–18.8) to 11.3
(range 3.7-16.4) Gt CO2, respectively (Fig. 1f), indicating that
warmer scenarios must rely on greater amounts negative emis-
sions technologies to reach net-zero emissions.
Regional energy use, energy sources, and electrification. Figure 2
shows regional differences in energy and emissions among net-zero
scenarios (in the year in which global CO2 emissions are net-zero).
In some cases, these differences are substantial and systematic. For
example, Fig. 2a shows that when global emissions are net-zero,
total final energy consumption is typically greatest in Asia (blue
points) and the OECD and EU countries (e.g., the U.S., U.K.,
France, Germany, etc.; pink points)—in some cases more than 3
times the energy use in the Middle East and Africa, Latin America,
and Eastern Europe (including Russia; yellow, green and purple
points, respectively). Regional differences in GDP per capita in the
net-zero year are somewhat less dramatic, but projections in the
OECD and EU region are often greatest (median of $67,944 per
person, range $47,534–$146,341), and projections in the Middle
East and Africa are often lowest (median of $18,960 per person,
range $6,263–$97,721; Fig. 2a).
As in the case of globally aggregated energy sources (Fig. 1c),
the share of primary energy derived from renewables and
different types of renewables are quite different across scenarios,
with relatively little sensitivity to the region (Fig. 2b). An
exception is Latin America (green points), which most scenarios
show having both a higher share of primary energy from
renewables (median 80%, range 33–98%) and a greater share of
those renewables from biomass (median 58%, range 12–83%)
than other regions (median shares of renewables 58–67%, and
median share of renewables from biomass 35–45%).
Regional variations in electrification are also small (regions’
median shares range from 43–52%), though final energy use per
capita varies across regions in a pattern similar to GDP per capita
(Fig. 2a and c; Supplementary Fig. 5). Despite lower GDP per
capita, energy use per capita in Eastern Europe and Russia is
similar to the OECD and EU region (median energy use of 105
and 112 GJ/person, respectively) — considerably greater than in
the other three regions, where median energy use ranges from
36–61 GJ/person (Fig. 2c; note that Eastern Europe and Russia
per capita final energy exceeded 200 GJ/person in 2 scenarios that
are not shown).
Regional Distribution of Residual and Negative Emissions.
Importantly, when global emissions are net-zero, emissions in many
scenarios are still net-positive in some regions and (proportionately)
net-negative in others. Figure 2d shows the regional balance of per
capita residual emissions from energy and industry and per capita
negative emissions from BECCS—i.e. net energy system emissions in
the region (when points are compared to the dashed black line).
These differences in residual (F-statistic= 141.6, p < 0.001) and
negative emissions (F-statistic= 70.7, p < 0.001) across regions can be
at least partially explained by differences in investment: Supple-
mentary Fig. 6 shows that cumulative investment in non-fossil
electricity supply up to the global net-zero year is correlated with
regional electrification (r= 0.55, p < 0.001), negative emissions from
BECCS (r= 0.58, p < 0.001), and residual emissions from energy and
industry (r= 0.86, p < 0.001; Supplementary Fig. 6). The positive
correlation between non-fossil electricity investment and both
BECCS and residual emissions is likely due to BECCS primarily
being used to offset residual emissions, such that scenarios with high
amounts of BECCS also have high amounts of residual emissions at
net-zero. Of course, investment is not the only cost-related driver of
these regional characteristics, but it does appear to play a significant
role in the smaller subset of scenarios that include investment output
values. Residual emissions per capita tend to be greater in regions of
Eastern Europe and Russia and the OECD and EU, withmedian
values of 1.9 (range 0.1–5.2) and 1.8 (range 0.2–4.9) t CO2/person,
respectively (purple and pink points in Fig. 2d). However, these
regions also have greater per capita negative emissions from BECCS
than Asia and the Middle East and Africa regions, such that they are
net-negative in nearly as many scenarios (40.1% and 49.4% for
Eastern Europe and Russia and OECD+EU, respectively) as they are
net-positive (59.9% and 50.6%, respectively). In contrast, Latin
America’s energy system is net-negative in 78.1% of the scenarios
(green points) and the Middle East and Africa and Asia regions are
net-negative in just 14.0% and 19.4%, respectively (orange and blue
points). This supports recent research on regional and country-level
negative emissions distributions in the context of regional net-zero
emissions40,41 and indicates that burden-sharing between currently
less-developed regions may not be well-balanced in IAM outputs
when global emissions reach net-zero. While there are many different
approaches to defining a well-balanced mitigation effort42, burden-
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sharing approaches that consider equity as a key component are vital
for meeting sustainable development goals43. Analysis of the
SR1.5 scenarios in the context of equitable emissions/negative emis-
sions allocation and sustainable development warrants further
research.
Figure 3a shows the global distributions of residual and negative
emissions in net-zero scenarios, including both those explicitly tied to
the energy system (i.e. residual emissions from energy and industrial
processes and negative emissions from BECCS) and those related to
agriculture and land use (including afforestation and reforestation),
which are major sources of negative emissions in many IAMs44. The
aggregate patterns are striking: in warmer scenarios, net emissions
from agriculture and land use tend to be less negative, residual
emissions are higher, and these trends must be compensated for by
larger negative emissions from BECCS (Fig. 3a). In net-zero scenarios
where warming is >2 °C, negative emissions from BECCS in the net-
zero year are on average 10.5 Gt CO2, and in no scenario <3.7 Gt
(range 3.7–16.4; Fig. 3a). In contrast, there are some 1.5 °C and
<2.0 °C scenarios in which there are no negative emissions from
BECCS because more modest residual emissions are balanced by
larger negative emissions from land uses (excluding BECCS), such as
afforestation (Table 1). The negative emissions from BECCS also
decrease in more ambitious mitigation scenarios, with mean values of
8.7 (range 0–18.8) Gt CO2 and 6.7 (range 0–16.7) Gt CO2 for <2.0 °C
and 1.5 °C scenarios, respectively (Fig. 3a; Table 1). Although residual
emissions by end-use sector were not available for many of the
scenarios we assessed, transportation was the dominant source of
residual emissions in the 40 scenarios which report these details,
followed by either the industry or residential and commercial sectors
(see Supplementary Fig. 7).
Global averages conceal considerable regional heterogeneity of
emissions in a net-zero world. Figure 3b shows that potential
negative emissions from land use are largest in Latin America (on
average −1.1 Gt CO2 in the net-zero year, range −4.8 to 1.7 Gt),
while Asia is projected to be by far the largest source of residual
emissions (on average 3.8 Gt CO2 in the net-zero year, range
0.3–10.3 Gt). Asia and the OECD and EU regions are also the
largest sources of negative emissions from BECCS, with
an average of 2.5 (range 0–8.7) and 2.4 (range 0–6.0) Gt negative
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Fig. 2 Characteristics of regional energy systems and emissions when global emissions reach net-zero. Scenarios that reach net-zero emissions globally
(n= 172 scenarios with all regions) show regional differences in energy use (a), energy sources (b), electrification (c), and net emissions (d). Points
represent individual scenarios, with a frequency of scenarios shown along each axis for each region (Asia= blue, Latin America = green, Middle East
+Africa = orange, OECD+ EU countries = pink, and Eastern Europe+Russia = purple). Colored dashed lines and values indicate medians for each
region. Gray dashed lines indicate global reference values for the year shown in gray.
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Relationships between scenario characteristics. Figure 4 com-
pares all 177 net-zero scenarios according to 6 global character-
istics in the net-zero year: the share of final energy that is
electricity, the share of primary energy derived from renewables,
the share of renewable energy that is derived from non-biomass
sources, energy conservation (i.e. the inverse of per capita energy
demand), the magnitude of negative emissions from BECCS, and
net land-use emissions. Each panel in Fig. 4 sorts all the scenarios
(rows) according to one of these characteristics (columns), with
scenario values shown as z-scores. Pairwise correlation coeffi-
cients (r) are also shown at the top of each column to quantita-
tively compare each set of parameters (Supplementary Fig. 8).
Plotted this way, for example in (a), it is evident that those sce-
narios in which electricity accounts for a greater share of final
energy also tend to be associated with greater shares of renewable
energy (r= 0.64, p < 0.05) and non-biomass renewable energy
(r= 0.59, p < 0.05), but less energy conservation (i.e. greater per
capita energy use, r=−0.35, p < 0.05; Fig. 4a). Scenarios with
greater shares of renewable energy tend to have higher shares of
non-biomass renewable energy (r= 0.50, p < 0.05; Fig. 4b), while
scenarios with greater amounts of energy conservation tend to
have lower shares of non-biomass renewable energy, and vice
versa (r=−0.46, p < 0.05; Fig. 4c and d). The relationship among
these characteristics and the magnitude of negative emissions
from BECCS and/or net land-use emissions is less clear, and
maybe more dependent on the IAM or specific scenario used in
each case. Since the process-based IAMs considered here use cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA)33, which minimizes the total miti-
gation costs of reaching a specified climate goal, all associations
between output variables are essentially a reflection of what is
cheapest. For example, in a scenario where substantial residual
emissions remain at net-zero and are offset by correspondingly
large amounts of negative emissions, reducing gross emissions to
zero must have been more expensive than continuing to emit and
offsetting with negative emissions. The most cost-effective out-
puts for scenarios are also based on the assumptions of individual
models, including the availability and cost of technologies.
To further explore this relationship between negative emissions
and other parameters, the underlying structure of the IAMs is
important to consider: some of the SR1.5 models are partial
equilibrium models (e.g., POLES ADVANCE) while others are
general equilibrium (e.g. AIM-CGE 2.0 and 2.1) or hybrid models
(e.g., MESSAGE-GLOBIOM 1.0) that link the two31. Additionally,
certain scenarios have conditions that limit the amount or type of
negative emissions technology used, such as EMF33_1.5C_limbio,
which sets a limit of 100 EJ/year for the amount of bioenergy from
BECCS, cellulosic fuels, and hydrogen31. Supplementary Fig. 9 shows
the scenario ranges for residual emissions, non-biomass renewable
energy share, and electrification for each model. These ranges
demonstrate how the structure and assumptions of individual models
affect the scenario outputs45,46: for example, GCAM scenarios tend to
have systematically higher residual emissions and lower amounts of
non-biomass renewable energy and electrification than those of other
models (Supplementary Fig. 9). Such model differences are visible
when comparing individual scenarios, but the output ranges tend to
bemore sensitive to the scenario constraints than the models
(Supplementary Fig. 10).
Discussion
In addition to renewable and net-zero targets, “electrify everything”
has become an explicit policy goal in a growing number of places47,
particularly regarding heating and cooking in the residential and
commercial sectors48,49 and light-duty transportation50,51. In con-
trast, in most net-zero scenarios, electricity accounts for less than
half (median 48.5%) of final energy (Fig. 1e), including in the
OECD and EU regions (Fig. 2c). Although electricity makes up a
greater fraction of final energy in all net-zero scenarios than it does
today (∼20% today), in some regions and cases electricity remains
less than 30% of final energy used (Fig. 2c). This emphasizes that
IAMs project considerable ongoing use of solid, liquid and gaseous
fuels in hard-to-electrify sectors (such as construction, agriculture,
aviation and shipping) even when emissions are net-zero (Supple-
mentary Fig. 11). In this context, lower levels of final energy use per
capita is one of the more robust trends of 1.5 °C scenarios. Mean-
while, our finding that electricity is somewhat less prevalent at the
net-zero point in scenarios with lower warming may reflect the
additional time available for end uses to electrify in less ambitious
(higher warming) scenarios (Fig. 1e and b).
Although the carbon intensity of final energy declines drastically in
many net-zero scenarios compared to present (∼80 Mt CO2/
EJ; Fig. 1d), the absolute quantity of residual emissions remains
substantial in many of the scenarios—as often as not >10 Gt CO2
globally in the net-zero year (Fig. 3). This translates into prodigious
quantities of negative emissions required, with perhaps proportional
social, techno-economic and biophysical challenges15,35,52. But we
also find that both the residual emissions and the negative emissions
required to offset them are not evenly distributed across world
regions (Figs. 2d and 3b), which may have important implications for
human development and equity53. In particular, net-zero scenarios
a
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Fig. 3 Residual and negative emissions when global emissions reach net-
zero. Residual and negative emissions in net-zero scenarios show global
differences across different warming levels (a) and regions (b). In each
case, the boxes show the range from 25th to 75th percentiles, whiskers
show the 5th and 95th percentiles, and the lines and circles within the boxes
denote the median and mean values, respectively.
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frequently show substantial negative emissions from land use in the
Latin America region but the bulk of residual emissions occurring in
other regions (Fig. 3b). Although the magnitude of negative emis-
sions is not strongly related to the composition of the energy system,
those scenarios with greater quantities of negative emissions from
BECCS seem to also have greater levels of final energy demand and
lower shares of non-biomass renewables (e.g., solar, wind, hydro;
Fig. 4e). In contrast, the scenarios with greater negative emissions
from land use (e.g., afforestation; represented by orange color in
Fig. 4f) also have higher final energy demand, but have higher shares
of non-biomass renewables (Fig. 4f). This reflects a logical trade-off in
the availability of bioenergy and land-based carbon storage and
suggests that the balance in IAMs outputs is being influenced by the
level of future energy demand. However, it should be noted that prior
studies have found that the value of negative emissions from BECCS
will be more important than the value of generated electricity54,55.
Finally, the relationships between energy use, GDP, and likely
warming amount show that energy use is often limited in net-zero
scenarios, especially for scenarios that limit warming to a greater
extent (Fig. 1a). The median final energy consumption in global
net-zero scenarios is 521 (range 227-857) EJ, compared to 418 EJ
in 201956. Given that global population is expected to reach
nearly 9.5 billion by 2064 (median net-zero year) in SSP257, if per
capita energy use remains constant at ∼55 GJ/person, total final
energy consumption will approach 523 EJ in 2064 – approxi-
mately equal to the net-zero scenario level. If instead per capita
energy use continues to increase by about 0.16 GJ/person per
year, as it did from 1971-2018 on average56,58, total final energy
consumption will approach 588 EJ in 2064 – 67 EJ above the net-
zero scenario level. So, in order to limit final energy use to ∼521
EJ in the median net-zero year, mean global per-capita energy use
would have to remain nearly constant.
The process-based IAMs considered here have proven extra-
ordinarily useful for articulating the overall shape of long-term
mitigation pathways at a macro-regional to a global scale, but
they are also limited in many ways that might influence our
understanding of net-zero on a more detailed level. For example,
because IAMs are designed to focus on larger-scale trends, they
tend to have lower technological, temporal, and spatial resolu-
tions compared with detailed energy system models59,60 and do
not consider the broad range of societal dynamics and political
economy factors that can drive national emissions reduction
strategies. Their strength in comprehensiveness is therefore
balanced by limits to the detail in which they can represent
regional or technological details that may be very relevant for
actual strategy making, particularly with regard to rapid and
disruptive technological change (e.g., management of electricity
grids with high penetration of variable renewables, electric cars,
greater digitalization, and hydrogen utilization pathways in heavy
industry). Some studies have shown that because of this lower
spatiotemporal detail, IAMs may be underestimating the role of
variable renewables such as solar PV60,61. Furthermore, in this
study we do not explicitly consider the detailed aspects of agri-
culture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector and non-
CO2 emissions; however, these aspects are accounted for in the
IAM frameworks themselves, which consistently include the
linkages and tradeoffs between AFOLU and non-CO2 emissions.
The global full-economy representation provided by IAMs in this
context makes them important tools in understanding pathways
to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions balance as foreseen in
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement. For all of these reasons, the net-
zero scenarios we analyze here certainly do not reflect many of
the details that will characterize net-zero emissions energy sys-
tems in the real world, but IAMs nonetheless remain critical
bridges between more detailed energy systems models and long-
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In the time since the SR1.5 database was released, increased
efforts have been made to improve the model representation of
key technologies, such as carbon-neutral liquid fuels, long-term
storage of variable renewable energy, and negative emissions
strategies. Given that these results show liquid fuels remaining
prevalent and negative emissions strategies becoming increasingly
important in the existing net-zero scenarios, such modeling
improvements will be important to monitor going forward. The
relationship between higher residual emissions and correspond-
ing higher amounts of negative emissions in warmer scenarios
points toward reducing residual emissions as a target for policy
improvement, since negative emissions strategies are required to
offset any amount of residual emissions at net-zero. Reliance on
massive amounts of future negative emissions poses a substantial
risk, given that there is still considerable uncertainty surrounding
the feasibility of negative emissions technologies at such large
scales15,35. Policies that support carbon-neutral fuels and tech-
nologies now would in turn reduce future reliance on large
quantities of negative emissions to avoid harmful levels of
warming. Our findings thus represent an opportunity to assess
emerging net-zero emissions policies and energy trends in the
context of the longer-term global goal of limiting climate change.
Methods
Data source. All of the model scenarios analyzed as part of this study were
obtained from the public 1.5 °C Scenario Database (the SR1.5 database), hosted by
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) through a process
facilitated by the Integrated Assessment Modelling Consortium (doi: 10.5281/
zenodo.3363345 | url: data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/iamc-1.5c-explorer). The model outputs
in the database were generated by the various Integrated Assessment Models
(IAMs) listed in Supplementary Table S1, and compiled by the Integrated
Assessment Modeling Consortium (IAMC)31,32. The full scenario set was curated
as part of the IPCC Special Report of Global Warming of 1.5 °C, Chapter 2 on
mitigation pathways and details of the models and scenarios are detailed in the
Technical Annex of the Chapter. The processes are described in more detail by
Huppmann et al.31,32. In this paper we use version r2.0 of the all regions dataset.
The 177 scenarios we assess here were produced by 7 main models (with 16
individual model variations), and thus are not truly independent of each other
since each IAM has its own assumptions built into the model framework.
While an updated scenario database is being developed for the upcoming IPCC
Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), our analysis is specifically about the characteristic
of the net-zero energy system at the point of net-zero, and not the pathway up to
that point. The broader insights of net-zero energy system characteristics gained
from our analysis are thus valuable and we expect they won’t differ significantly in
subsequent analyses of the next generation of (AR6) scenarios. Moreover, although
recent developments in the power sector, e.g. renewables, have been faster than
expected, the observed values for 2019–2020 are still within the range of the
SR1.5 scenarios. For example, in 2020, approximately 2.9 EJ was generated from
solar electricity62 and the SR1.5 scenario outputs for Secondary Energy|Electricity|
Solar in 2020 range from 0.2–6.6 EJ, with a median value of 1.8 EJ and a mean value
of 2.4 EJ. For wind energy, approximately 5.9 EJ was generated in 202062, and the
SR1.5 scenario outputs for Secondary Energy|Electricity|Wind in 2020 range from
1.0–23.6 EJ, with a median value of 7.4 EJ and a mean value of 6.9 EJ.
IAMs have a long and sometimes controversial history in their efforts to
characterize emissions pathways with the aim of mitigating climate change. The
IAMs here are primarily what would be considered as complex “process-based”
IAMs, as opposed to simpler “cost-benefit” IAMs that primarily simulate climate-
economy relationships to estimate the social cost of carbon63.
They use a variety of over-arching modelling methods including linear
programming, partial- and computable general equilibrium, and recursive-dynamic
formulations. The models used tend to represent macro-economic regions,
comprising large countries and trading blocs, ranging from a few to tens of regions
with inter-regional trade of commodities, such as fuels and biomass. This regional
information was aggregated in the IPCC SR1.5 process to a common 5-region
definition (as above) to facilitate comparison. Temporal resolution is typically at 5
or 10-year timesteps, which is good for determining the levels of investments
required, whilst abstractions need to be made to ensure that reliability of electricity
systems remains plausible, such as ensuring that enough flexible reserve is available
to meet peak electricity demands.
Scenarios representing climate policy tend to be implemented using carbon
budget constraints that limit the cumulative carbon emissions over a period such
that warming does not pass the desired level, e,g. 2 °C. Further scenario-related
constraints may limit a wide range of parameters, such as technological options
and shares, rates of change and diffusion etc.
The IAMs whose scenarios we assess here do not include feedbacks from
climate impacts and damages, despite the fact that some studies have shown these
could be substantial64,65. Rather the models are designed to inform mitigation
efforts and have relatively simplistic representations of the Earth system65. Some
IAMs are beginning to include feedbacks between, for example, temperature
changes and energy use66, and more ambitious efforts are underway that will
incorporate human energy, food and water systems into robust Earth system
models67,68.
Filtering and analysis of scenarios. Our analysis includes only scenarios that
reach net-zero CO2 emissions by the end of this century (year 2100). We define the
net-zero emissions year for each scenario (i.e., the x-axis in Fig. 1b) as the first year
that net global CO2 emissions were equal to or less than zero. Because each model
produces parameter outputs at 5 or 10 year time steps, we interpolated annual data
using second-order polynomials.
We only consider CO2 and not CH4 or N2O for several reasons. First, many of the
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Fig. 4 Relative characteristics of scenarios in the global net-zero year.
Panels show parameter standard deviations for scenarios (rows) sorted by
(a) electrification, (b) renewables share, (c) non-biomass renewables
share, (d) energy conservation, (e) negative emissions from BECCS, and
(f) net land-use emissions. “Electrification” is the share of final energy
consumed as electricity. “Renewables” is the share of primary energy
supplied by biomass, solar, wind, hydroelectricity, and geothermal. “Non-
biomass ren.” is the share of renewable energy sources provided by sources
other than biomass. “Energy conservation” here reflects the inverse of final
energy per capita, such that warmer colors indicate higher levels of energy
consumption. “Negative ems-BECCS” is the total amount of negative
emissions from bioenergy with carbon capture and storage. “Net ems-land
use” is the net amount of global CO2 emissions related to land use. Mean
and standard deviation for parameters are shown below each column, and
pairwise correlation coefficients (r) are shown in bold at the top of each
column. Black r-values are statistically significant (p < 0.05), while red
r-values are not.
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analysis will therefore be relevant to those policies in the context of net-zero CO2.
Second, entirely eliminating CH4 or N2O emissions will entail the development of
new technologies, particularly for removing these gases from the atmosphere69, such
that there are not yet practicable pathways to net-zero for these gases7. Third, N2O is
primarily related to agriculture, and our analysis is focused on the energy system.
The scenarios are categorized into 6 regions (global and the five world regions
defined in the SR1.5 database) and 3 consolidated levels of end-of-century global
warming, based on the wider set determined in the IPCC report:
● 1.5 °C, which includes “below 1.5 °C,” “1.5 °C return with low overshoot,”
“1.5 °C return with high overshoot”;
● 2 °C, which includes “lower 2.0 °C” and “higher 2.0 °C,” and;
● >2 °C, which corresponds to the category “above 2.0 °C”. These scenarios
have >50% likelihood of exceeding global mean temperature change of
2.0 °C by 2100, with no set upper bound of temperature change.
These global warming outcomes are primarily characterized by the “likely”
(>50% chance) of reaching the specified temperature level by 2100. Further sub-
categories of “overshoot” scenarios, based on the peak-warming and then return to
a stabilization temperature help identify between scenarios that rely on substantial
amounts of net-negative emissions.
The output variables for IAMs in the SR1.5 database are not entirely consistent;
some models have extensive lists of outputs and regional and sectoral breakdowns,
while others have comparatively few outputs and are missing some variables
altogether. Our analysis therefore relies only on those IAM scenarios that include
all output variables required for our analysis (177 out of 202 total net-zero
emissions scenarios from the SR1.5 database; see Supplementary Table S1). Our
interest in including as many scenarios as possible had to be balanced against our
interest in exploring more detailed geographical and technological characteristics.
Our analysis used the following 7 output variables: (1) CO2 emissions (total net,
energy and industrial processes net, AFOLU net), (2) Population, (3) GDP (PPP),
(4) Primary energy, direct equivalent (total, fossil, nuclear, solar, wind, hydro,
biomass), (5) Carbon Sequestration through BECCS, (6) Carbon price, and (7)
Final energy (total and share from electricity). Residual CO2 emissions were
calculated by adding the residual emissions from energy and industrial processes
(and, if applicable, the residual AFOLU emissions) to the amount of carbon
sequestration from BECCS (since BECCS is used to offset residual emissions) in the
net-zero year via the following equations:
If ‘Emissions|CO2|Energy and Industrial Processes’ is positive at net-zero:
● ‘Emissions|CO2|Residual Fossil’ = ‘Emissions|CO2|Energy and Industrial
Processes’ + ‘Carbon Sequestration|CCS|Biomass’
If ‘Emissions|CO2|Energy and Industrial Processes’ is negative at net-zero:
● ‘Emissions|CO2|Residual Fossil’ = ‘Emissions|CO2|Energy and Industrial
Processes’ + ‘Carbon Sequestration|CCS|Biomass’ + ‘Emissions|CO2|
AFOLU’
All processing and analysis was done in JupyterLab (version 1.2.6). Code is
available via GitHub: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.550162370
Additional context for policymakers. Around the world, countries and jur-
isdictions are adopting energy policies that mandate high levels of renewable or
zero-carbon electricity in the next few decades8,9. For example, in the U.S., 14 states
(California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington) have
laws requiring that >50% of electricity come from renewables such as wind, solar
and biomass (but often excluding large-scale hydropower). Such goals are con-
sistent with our analysis of net-zero scenarios generated by IAMs; renewables
(including hydro) account for >50% of all primary energy in 74% of the net-zero
scenarios. However, many places have pledged or mandated 100% renewable
electricity and/or 100% net-zero emissions economy-wide by 2050, including the
proposed EU Climate Law, and laws or government orders in the U.S. states of
Hawaii, New York, Washington and California. Although details of these plans
vary, it is noteworthy that very few of the net-zero scenarios reflect these goals at
the macro-region level. This is due to the way that sources and sinks, from energy
and land-use sectors, and between CO2 and non-CO2 sources, are optimized over
much larger spatial extents including the influence of inter-regional trade, rather
than the aforementioned policies that are enacted at state- and country-level. For
example, the share of primary energy derived from renewables in the first year of
net-zero or net-negative emissions is <80% in all but 2 of the 177 scenarios
(Fig. 1c). Similarly, emissions in the OECD and EU region remain net-positive in
more than half of the net-zero scenarios (pink points in Fig. 2d). Thus, we advise
caution when interpreting these results, to note that the aforementioned zero-
carbon energy policies are not necessarily over-ambitious or inconsistent with
global and macro-regional IAM scenarios, because other nearby places and regions
(e.g., Middle East and Africa), are likely to still be net-positive at the point at which
global CO2 emissions hit net-zero (Fig. 2d).
Data availability
All of the model scenarios analyzed as part of this study were obtained from the public
1.5 °C Scenario Database (the SR1.5 database), hosted by the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) through a process facilitated by the Integrated
Assessment Modelling Consortium (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3363345 | url:
data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/iamc-1.5c-explorer).
Code availability
All processing and analysis was done in JupyterLab (version 1.2.6). Code is available via
GitHub: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.550162370
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